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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The Parties to this proceeding are: 
Tyler Hansen Plaintiff/Appellant 
rI he Workers Compensation Fund of Utah Plaintiff/Appellant 
i : * Defendant Appellee 
The Nature Conservancy Defendant/Appellee 
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II 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Parties to the Proceeding I 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities v 
Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review 1 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and Regulations . . . . . . . 2 
Statement of the Case 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Statement of the Facts 5 
Summary of the Arguments 6 
Point I 6 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is a 
reasonable and valid exercise of the power to 
regulate bicycles which power is delegated to 
c i t i e s by Utah Code A n n o t a t e d 
Section 41-6-17(l)(h). 
ii 
Pag 
Point II 
The Trial Court erred in ruling that there was no 
legal justification for Hansen traveling eastbound 
in the north bicycle lane on 200 South. 
Point III 9 
The repeal or judicial invalidation of an ordinance 
does not allow prior action taken in reliance upon 
that ordinance to serve as a basis for finding that 
such action was negligent. 
Point IV 10 
Actions taken in conformance with existing law 
are not negligent. 
IX. Argument 11 
Point I 11 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is a 
reasonable and valid exercise of the power to 
regulate bicycles which power is delegated to 
in 
Pag 
c i t i e s by Utah Code A n n o t a t e d 
Section 41-6-17(l)(h). 
Point II .19 
The Trial Court erred in ruling that there was no 
legal justification for Hansen traveling eastbound 
in the north bicycle lane on 200 South. 
PointHI . . . . 23 
The repeal or judicial invalidation of an ordinance 
does not allow prior action taken in reliance upon 
that ordinance to serve as a basis for finding that 
such action was negligent. 
Point IV 25 
Actions taken in conformance with existing law 
are not negligent. 
Conclusion 27 
Appendix 29 
iv 
Ill 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Page 
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9 2,10,24,25 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 18 2, 10, 24,25 
STATUTES. RULES and ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 
15,16,17,18,19,20,22 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87 2,4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 
15,17,18,20,21,22,23 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87.5 3, 13, 14,16,17,20,21,23 
Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-5 3 
Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-11 3 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 1,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14, 
15,16,17,18,19,21,23,25,27 
CASES 
Gaw v State ex. Rel. Dep't of Transportation. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah app. 1990) 15 
Gilgerv Hernandez. 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000) 22 
Hall v Warren. 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 1984) 16 
In re Ennenga. 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001) 9, 24 
Jerz v Salt Lake County. 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991) 8,22 
J.J.W. v State. 33 P.3d 59 (Utah 2001) 8,21,22 
Madsen v Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 9,24 
Metropolitan holding company v Board of Review of the City of Milwaukee. 
173 Wise. 2d 626,495 N.W. 2d 314 (1993) 26 
Monson v Carver. 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996) 9, 24 
Murray City v Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) 7, 8, 19,22 
Olsen v Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co.. 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) 9,24 
Orton v Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998) 2 
State, ex rel Coastal Management. Inc. v Washington County. 
159 Or. App. 533, 979 P.2d 300 (1999) 26 
State, ex rel Kaczkowski v Fire & Police Commissioners of City of Milwaukee. 
33 Wise. 2d 488, 148 N.W. 2d 44 (1967) 11,25 
Schlossberg v Schlossberg. 275 Md. 600,626, 343 A.2d234 (1975) 26 
Stratford v Crossman. 655 S.W. 2d 500 (Ky. 1983) 26 
Taghipour v Jerez. 52 P.3d 1252 (Utah 2002) 22 
Wolfgram v Wells Fargo Bank. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 53 Cal. App. 4th 43 (1997) 26 
vi 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1032 (4th ed. 1968) 10,25 
Model Utah Jury Instructions No. 3.11 (1993) 16,26 
vn 
IY 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is derived from Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2. 
V 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Is Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 a reasonable and valid exercise of the 
power, granted to cities by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h), to regulate 
the operation of bicycles within the City? 
2. Did Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 allow Plaintiff, Tyler Hansen, to ride 
his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South at 500 East? 
3. Can a person be found negligent solely for riding a bicycle in a designated 
bicycle lane on the left-hand side of a roadway, where a duly enacted city 
ordinance allows such conduct? 
4. Can a person be found to be negligent for acting in conformance with an 
existing city ordinance which may later be held to be invalid? 
5. Did the Trial Court err in holding that the jury could be instructed that riding 
a bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane was not justified by the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance? 
6. Should the Trial Court have granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment? 
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The above issues are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Orton v 
Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
These issues were preserved for appeal in the arguments presented to the trial court at 
oral argument on the various motions for partial summary judgment. They were argued on 
June 5, 2002 and discussed in the various memoranda submitted to the trial court in support 
of the motions for partial summary judgment. See Transcript of June 5, 2002 hearing on 
motions for summary judgment (hereinafter "Transcript"); Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated September 26, 2001 (hereinafter 
"Memorandum"); Response to Cross Motion of Defendant, the Nature Conservancy, for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated April 5, 2002 (hereinafter "Response"); Reply to Response of 
Defendant, the Nature Conservancy, to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment dated April 22, 2002 (hereinafter "Reply"). 
VI 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ORDINANCES. 
RULES and REGULATIONS 
1. Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9 
2. Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 18 
3. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17 
4. Utah Code Ann. Section 41 -6-87 
2 
5. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87.5 
6. Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-5 
7. Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-11 
8. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 
VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellants, Tyler Hansen and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, brought this 
action for negligence. They claimed, inter alia, that Tyler Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen") was 
lawfully riding his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah on February 17,2000. As Hansen approached the 500 East intersection on a green light, 
Defendant Amanda S. Eyre (hereinafter "Eyre") was stopped facing south on a red light. She 
commenced a right turn on a red light, turning westward onto 200 South and struck Hansen 
with the front of her car. At the time of the collision, Hansen was riding eastbound in the 
bicycle lane as allowed by Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.70.080(1)(I). At the time of the 
collision, both Hansen and Eyre were acting in the course of their employment. Eyre's 
employer, the Nature Conservancy Group (hereinafter "Nature") was named as a Defendant 
on a theory of respondent superior. Hansen was covered by Workers Compensation insurance 
at the time of the accident. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter "the Fund") 
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paid benefits to Hansen for injuries received in the collision. The Fund was named as a 
Plaintiff based on its statutory subrogation rights. 
The Defendants claimed Hansen was negligent because he was not riding on the right 
hand side of 200 South. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs asked the court to rule that pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1), Hansen had a legal right to travel eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200 
South as he approached 500 East. Memorandum at 2. Defendants argued that State Law (Utah 
Code Ann. Section 41-6-87) required Hansen to operate his bicycle on the right side of the 
roadway and that the City Ordinance 12.80.070 conflicts with state law and is, therefore, 
invalid. See R. 109-126 
On June 5,2002, the matter was considered by the trial court, Judge Lubeck presiding. 
Plaintiffs claimed the City Ordinance was valid on the date of the accident and, even if the 
Court held the Ordinance invalid, it could only invalidate it prospectively. See Memorandum, 
supra; Response, supra; Reply, supra; Transcript ("Tr.") at 5-7. Hansen argued that the 
Ordinance clearly allowed him to be in the left-hand bicycle lane and, at the time of the 
accident, his riding in the left-hand lane could not be held negligentper se. Tr. 5-7. On June 5, 
2002, the Court denied the Motions for Summary Judgment and said: 
The Court finds that State law was and is (and probably always 
has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor 
vehicle traffic. 
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An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with 
such state law . . . Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle 
traffic... may or may not be within the police powers of the city. 
The Court is not ruling on that aspect as it is without sufficient 
facts. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
Plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling 
in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis added). R. 164. 
Plaintiffs timely filed a petition for permission to appeal the Court's June 5, 2002 
Order pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On August 23, 2002, the 
Supreme Court granted permission to appeal and assigned the case to the Court of Appeals 
for disposition. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On February 17,2000, Hansen was riding his bicycle eastbound in a designated bicycle 
lane on the north side of 200 South approaching 500 East in Salt Lake City. As Hansen 
approached 500 East, the traffic signal for eastbound traffic was green. 
Eyre was southbound on 500 East and stopped for a red light at 200 South. With the 
light red for southbound traffic, she commenced a right turn onto 200 South. As she rounded 
the comer, she struck Hansen with the front of her car. Hansen was riding in a designated 
bicycle lane at the time of the collision. 
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At the time of the collision, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)(I) specifically 
allowed bicycle riders to ride on the left-hand side of a roadway within a designated bicycle 
lane. The Ordinance is still in effect. 
VIII 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41-6-17(l)(h) ALLOWS LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO 
REGULATE THE OPERATION OF BICYCLES WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION. 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.0700) IS A REASONABLE AND VALID 
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLES. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-17(l)(h) grants to cities the power and authority 
to adopt ordinances to regulate the operation of bicycles within city limits. This power is 
subject only to the reasonable exercise of the police power. 
Pursuant to this grant of authority, Salt Lake City adopted an Ordinance which 
regulated the operation of bicycles. It required, inter alia, that on streets where there exist 
designated bicycle lanes, the operator of a bicycle must ride within the bicycle lane [Section 
12.80.070(H)], but the rider has the option to ride in a bicycle lane on either side of the street 
[Section 12.80.070(1)]. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-87 requires bicycle riders traveling at less than the 
normal speed of traffic to travel on the right side of the roadway, subject to certain exceptions 
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set forth in said section. A reasonable exercise of the police power would allow the city to 
create additional exceptions, including allowing use of the designated bicycle lane on either 
side of the roadway, because Section 41-6-87(3) already provides an exception for a bicycle 
lane (path). 
Defendants argued that the right-hand travel requirement of Section 41-6-87 was 
absolute and the City's Ordinance was invalid. 
However, the Trial Court ruled that Defendants had failed to meet their burden of 
showing the Ordinance exceeded the power to adopt bicycle ordinances granted by Section 
41-6-17(1). Therefore, the Trial Court did not rule Ordinance 12.80.070 to be invalid. R. 164. 
Because there was no evidence presented to the Trial Court which would allow the 
invalidation of the Salt Lake City Bicycle Ordinance, the Ordinance is presumptively valid. 
Murray City v Hall 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). Therefore, Hansen was acting lawfully when 
he rode his bicycle eastbound on the north side of 200 South at the time of the collision with 
the Eyre vehicle and the Trial Court should have granted Summary Judgment on that issue. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR HANSEN RIDING HIS BICYCLE EASTBOUND IN THE 
NORTH BICYCLE LANE ON 200 SOUTH. 
In its June 5,2002 Order, R. 162, the Trial Court refused to invalidate Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.80.070, yet it ruled that the jury must be instructed that Hansen had no legal 
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justification for riding in the left-hand bicycle lane at the time of the collision with the Eyre 
vehicle. Such a ruling is logically inconsistent and in error. 
When read together, the State Statute (41-6-87) and City Ordinance (12.80.070) do not 
create a conflict. Section 41-6-87 is a general statute providing that in defined circumstances, 
bicycle riders are to ride, with certain defined exceptions, on the right-hand side of the road.1 
The City Ordinance is specific as to where bicycles are to be ridden when there are designated 
bicycle lanes on a city street. There is no irreconcilable conflict with the State Statute that also 
says bicycles may be operated in designated bicycle lanes. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3). 
Where two laws treat the same subject matter, a specific enactment controls a general 
one. J.J.W. v State, 33 P.3d 59 (Utah 2001). 
The Court also has a duty to construe an ordinance so as to give it full force and effect. 
Jerz v Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). The court also construes acts to be in 
harmony so as to avoid conflicts. Id; Murray City v Hall, supra. 
Because courts have a duty to construe each enactment so as to give it full force and 
effect, wherever possible, they should construe acts to be in harmony and to avoid conflicts. 
This is especially so in this case, because the duty set forth in U.C.A. Section 41-6-87 is not 
absolute, being subject to certain exceptions. The legislature itself has provided exceptions to 
*One of the exceptions designated is when traveling in a designated bicycle path 
(lane). See Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3). A designate bicycle lane which is 
adjacent to the traveled portion of a city street would clearly be within the exception set 
forth in Section 41-6-87(3) 
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the general duty to ride on the right-hand side of the roadway. This Court should harmonize 
the two acts to give effect to each. The Ordinance allowing travel in a left-hand bicycle lane 
is a valid exercise of the City's police power and Hansen was, as a matter of law, justified in 
riding in conformity therewith. 
Point HI 
THE REPEAL OR JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF AN ORDINANCE DOES NOT 
ALLOW PRIOR ACTION TAKEN IN RELIANCE UPON THAT ORDINANCE TO 
SERVE AS A BASIS FOR FINDING THAT SUCH ACTION WAS NEGLIGENT. 
Defendants asked the Trial Court to hold that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) 
was invalid, being an impermissible exercise of the power to regulate the operation of bicycles 
granted by Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h). R. 111-115. 
Plaintiffs responded that even if the Trial Court should strike down the City Ordinance, 
Hansen's conduct on the date of the collision would not be unlawful or negligent because he 
had acted pursuant to an extant city ordinance that allowed him to travel in the left-hand 
bicycle lane. Tr.6. 
To rule otherwise would make punishable as a crime, conduct that was presumptively 
lawful under the extant City Ordinance. Such a result would violate Hansen's constitutional 
right to be free from ex post facto laws. Monson v Carver, 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1996); In re 
Ennenga. 37 P.3d 1150 (Utah 2001). 
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A long standing rule of statutory construction is that enactments which affect substantial 
law are not applied retroactively. Olsen v Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., 956 P.2d 257 
(Utah 1998); Madsen v Borthick. 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). Therefore, even if the Trial Court 
had invalidated the Ordinance, and thereby caused Hansen's conduct to become invalid, it 
could not do so retroactively. Id. To hold otherwise would conflict with the longstanding rule 
of statutory construction set out above, and would also violate the Constitutional Rights 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 18 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the Trial Court clearly misapplied the law in its June 5,2002 ruling and erred 
when it said: 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff 
was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the 
direction he was against traffic. 
Point IV 
ACTIONS DONE IN CONFORMANCE WITH AN EXISTING LAW ARE NOT 
NEGLIGENT. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) clearly allows a bicycle rider to ride in the left-
hand bicycle lane. The Trial Court refused to apply or invalidate the Ordinance. However, the 
Court then ruled that Hansen had no legal right to ride in the left-hand bicycle lane, and said 
the jury instructions would have to be tailored to state that Hansen was not legally justified 
traveling in the left-hand bicycle lane. Id. 
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The term "lawful" is defined as "legal; warranted or authorized by law..." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1032 (4th ed. 1968). Lawful conduct is that conduct which is expected of an 
individual or entity in the day to day activities of life. Society expects one to act "lawfully." 
In determining if one has acted lawfully in any situation, the question asked is "did he 
follow the law?" See State, ex rel Kaczkowski v Fire & Police Commissioners of City of 
Milwaukee, 33 Wisc.2d 488, 148 N.W.2d 44 (1967). 
Therefore, Hansen was acting lawfully when he rode in accordance with the express 
language of the City Ordinance. He is entitled to rely upon the language of the Ordinance as 
defining lawful conduct. A person who acts in accordance with the express language of an 
existing law may not be found negligent because he acted in has a right to rely on the law as 
being valid. Counsel has found no authority that would gainsay this elementary proposition. 
Therefore, because the Salt Lake City Ordinance specifically allows a bike rider to ride 
in a left-hand bicycle lane in Salt Lake City, the Trial Court erred in holding that such conduct 
could be considered by the jury as a basis for finding Hansen was negligent. 
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IX 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 41 -6-17(1)01) ALLOWS LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO 
REGULATE THE OPERATION OF BICYCLES WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION. 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070m IS A REASONABLE AND VALID 
EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO REGULATE BICYCLES. 
A. Background 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-17(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, 
with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of police power, from: 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles . . . . 
Salt Lake City, pursuant to the power granted by Section 41-6-17(1 )(h) adopted Chapter 
12.80 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances. Ordinance 12.80.070 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
(H) when riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to 
ride upon the sidewalk or any portion of the roadway outside the 
marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn; 
(I) to ride upon the left hand side of any street, except when they 
are within a marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-way 
street (emphasis added). 
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Under the plain language of the Ordinance, a bicycle rider in Salt Lake City has a legal 
duty to ride within the marked bicycle lanes on any city street where designated bicycle lanes 
exist [Section 12.80.070(H)]. Moreover, the Ordinance allows a rider the option of riding in 
either the right-hand or left-hand bicycle lane [Section 12.80.070(1)]. 
Plaintiffs asked the District Court to rule, as a matter of law, that Ordinance 
12.80.070(1) allowed Hansen to lawfully operate his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on 
200 South in Salt Lake City on the date of the collision. See Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. R.45. 
Defendant Eyre responded to the Summary Judgment Motion by filing a Rule 56(f) 
affidavit and memorandum claiming discovery was not complete and that the motion was 
premature. See Defendant's Rule 56(f) Affidavit with Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R. 54; Affidavit of Attorney Gary D. 
Josephson, Counsel for Defendant. R.60. Plaintiffs argued it was a pure legal question and did 
not require any factual finding. Therefore, the Rule 56(f) Affidavit was inappropriate to the 
legal issue presented to the Court. See Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Rule 56(f) with 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R.65. The 
Trial Court deferred a ruling pending completion of Discovery. See Minute Entry. R.72. 
The parties began discovery. The Nature Conservancy was added as a party because Ms. 
Eyre was in the course of her employment at the time of the collision. See Third Amended 
Complaint. R.81. Following the deposition of Hansen, The Nature Conservancy 
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("Conservancy") filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Trial Court to rule 
that travel by Hansen in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200 South violated Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5. R. 107. The thrust of Conservancy's argument was that since 
U.C.A. Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5 do not provide an express exception for travel in a 
bicycle lane, Hansen's action in conformance with the City Ordinance was unlawful. R. 112-
115. 
Conservancy thus asked the trial court to rule that Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was invalid, 
and that Hansen violated Utah Code Ann. Sections 41 -6-87 and 41 -6-87.5 by riding eastbound 
in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200 South. R. 115. Defendant Eyre joined in the Cross-Motion. 
R.127. 
In response, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Cross-Motion and 
renewed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R.45, which had been previously filed 
and briefed. See R.132;139. 
Plaintiff argued Ordinance 12.80.070(1) allowed Hansen to travel in the left-hand 
bicycle lane at the time of the collision. R.45-50;133.138;1551-154. Defendants argued Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5 are controlling and the City Ordinance is invalid 
because it conflicts with these Statutes. R.l 11-115,145-147. 
Plaintiffs also argued that even if the Court were to declare Ordinance 12.80.070(1) 
invalid, Hansen's actions on the date of the collision were lawful because he acted in reliance 
on the extant Ordinance. Tr. 7. 
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Defendants presented no evidence to the court that would carry their burden of showing 
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was not a reasonable exercise of the City's police power pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-17(1 )(h). They offered no evidence of an irreconcilable conflict between 
the Ordinance and U.C.A. Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5. The Trial Court said in its Order 
ofJune5,2002: 
However, the Court is without any facts (as pointed out by the 
Plaintiff) to find that such an ordinance is not within the 
reasonable police powers. R.164. 
The Trial Court specifically declined to rule on whether or not the Ordinance was valid. It said, 
"the Court is not ruling on that aspect as it is without sufficient facts." R.164. 
After declining to rule on the validity of the Ordinance, the Court said: 
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah Statute 
to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic. Nothing in 
the state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles against 
vehicle traffic is approved. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff 
was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the 
direction he was against traffic (emphasis added). R.164. 
B. Argument 
1. The Trial Court's ruling is inconsistent. 
The Trial Court determined the Defendants failed to present any basis to invalidate 
Ordinance 12.80.070, and failed to show that it was not a proper exercise of the police power 
granted under Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(1 )(h). See R. 164. Yet the effect of the Court's 
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ruling was to hold Hansen in violation of the State Statute, while riding in compliance with the 
Salt Lake City Ordinance, and ruled that the jury is to be so instructed. R. 164. 
Such a ruling is inconsistent and contrary to law. The valid Salt Lake City Ordinance is 
determinative of the issue of whether Hansen was riding lawfully at the time of the collision. 
If Hansen was in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87 at the time of the 
collision, then Defendants could argue that such conduct was negligent and request the jury to 
be so instructed. Gaw v State ex.rel. Dep't of Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah app. 1990); 
Hall v Warren, 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 1984). See Model Utah Jury Instructions ("MUJI) no. 3.11 
(1993).2 
However, if Hansen was acting lawfully and in compliance with the provisions of 
Ordinance 12.80.070(1), then Defendants could not claim he was negligent by riding in the left-
hand lane. Moreover, Hansen would be entitled to an instruction saying he had a legal right to 
ride his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane pursuant to the Ordinance. 
The Trial Court cannot logically decline to hold the Ordinance invalid while ordering 
the jury instructions to reflect a duty to ride only on the right-hand side of the road. If the 
Ordinance is valid, Hansen may legally ride on the left-hand side of a street in a designated 
2
 In their memoranda and argument, Defendants also claimed application of 
Section 41-6-87.5 which deals with the method of making left turns. This section has no 
real application to the facts of this case since Hansen was not involved in a left turn at the 
time of the collision. He testified he intended to enter the 500 East intersection where he 
intended to turn left, but was struck prior to reaching the intersection. Since he was not 
involved in a left-turn maneuver at the time of the collision, Section 41-6-87.5 would 
have no application to the facts of this case. 
16 
bicycle lane. Having declined to rule the Ordinance invalid, the Trial Court erred in ruling that 
the jury must be instructed that Hansen's riding in the bike lane was not justified by the 
Ordinance and could be considered to be negligent. 
2. Ordinance 12.80.070 is a reasonable exercise of the power granted to cities by 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h) 
The only limitation our Legislature has placed on the right of cities to regulate the 
operation of bicycles on city streets is that a city reasonably exercise the police power. Utah 
Code Ann. Section 41-6-17 (1953 as amended). The Ordinance at issue provides that on streets 
where there are bicycle lanes, bicycles are to travel in such bicycle lanes. Ordinance 
12.80.070(H). The language of the Ordinance specifically provides a bicycle may travel in the 
left-hand bicycle lane. Ordinance 12.80.070(1). 
Counsel has found no Utah authority dealing specifically with the issue of whether such 
an ordinance is within the power delegated to cities to regulate bicycle traffic. However, an 
analysis of the applicable statutes clearly mandates the conclusion that the City has not 
exceeded its authority in adopting Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I). 
Defendants claim that the Ordinance is invalid, that it conflicts with state law, and that 
it was an improper exercise of the police power, conflicting with Utah Code Ann. Section 41-
6-87, and , to the extent it may have any application (see f.n.l), Section 41-6-87.5. See 
R.lll-115;145-147. 
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Section 41-6-87(1) clearly provides that a bicycle operator riding at less than normal 
traffic speed3 must ride "as near as practicable to the right hand edge of the roadway . . ." 
Section 41-6-87(1) allows three specific exceptions to the right-hand operation requirement. 
One of these is when "preparing to make a left-hand turn at an intersection." See Section 41 -6-
87(1 )(b). It is undisputed that Hansen intended to turn left at the 500 East intersection. 
Therefore, his riding in the left-hand bicycle lane fits within the exception. 
Even if the facts were otherwise, the requirement of Section 41-6-87(1) that a bicycle 
travel on the right edge of the roadway is subject to exceptions. Nothing in the Section would 
indicate in intent to prevent a city from adopting additional exceptions, pursuant to the power 
granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h) to regulate bicycles. 
In fact, Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87(3) specifically provides: 
If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a 
roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.4 
The bicycle lanes at issue are adjacent to the traveled portion of 200 South. Bike riders 
are required to use designated lanes when provided. The lanes border the traveled portions of 
the roadway. The bicycle lanes are clearly "a path adjacent to a roadway" and bicycle riders 
3
 The constraint imposed by section 41-6-87 applies when the bicycle is operated 
at "less than normal speed of traffic." The undisputed testimony is that Mr. Hansen was 
riding at approximately 20 M.P.H. at the time of the collision. Since this is, arguably, 
"operation at the normal speed of traffic," it could be argued that section 41-6-87 does not 
even apply and is not in conflict with the Ordinance. 
4
 This is the identical requirement imposed by Ordinance 12.80.070(H) that where 
there is a marked bicycle lane (path) bicycles must travel in the bicycle lane and not in the 
roadway. 
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are required to use them for travel. A bicycle rider using such lane is exempted from the right 
hand travel requirement. Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87. 
Having provided the exceptions set out in Section 41-6-87(1), it cannot logically be 
concluded that the power granted to cities by Section 41-6-17(l)(h) precludes adopting 
additional exceptions, particularly respecting the use of designated bicycle lanes which exist 
solely for the use of bicycle traffic. 
There is simply no justifiable basis for arguing that Salt Lake City has exceeded the 
authority to regulate the operation of bicycles in the City granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h). 
The Ordinance is presumptively valid. Murray City v Hall supra. This court should rule that 
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is valid and that Hansen was acting lawfully while riding eastbound 
in a bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION FOR HANSEN RIDING HIS BICYCLE EASTBOUND IN THE 
NORTH BICYCLE LANE ON 200 SOUTH. 
A. Introduction 
The Trial Court declined to rule that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) was invalid. 
R. 164. The Court said: 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff 
was not justified by ordinance nor State law in traveling in the 
direction he was against traffic. Id. 
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In reaching the conclusion that Plaintiff was not justified in traveling in the left-hand 
bicycle lane at the time of the collision, the Court found: 
State law was and is (and probably always has been) clear that 
bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic. R. 164 
However, having made this finding, the Trial Court expressly pointed out that the 
Defendants failed to present any facts to support their claim that the Ordinance was not a 
reasonable exercise of the City's police power granted under Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-
17(l)(h). Id. The Trial Court discussed the matter as follows: 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with 
such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate bicycle 
traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under 41-6-17. To 
allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in a marked 
bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of incident that is the 
subject of this lawsuit. However, the Court is without any facts (as 
pointed out by Plaintiff) to find that such an ordinance is not 
within the reasonable police powers. However, from a common 
sense standpoint it is well known that the tendency of most 
motorists, any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when they are 
turning right onto a perpendicular street, is to look to their left for 
oncoming traffic, but not to look to their right. Thus, an ordinance 
that allows such bicycle traffic as Plaintiff argues may or may not 
be within the police powers of the City. The Court is not ruling on 
that aspect as it is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the 
ordinance appears to create problems with bicyclists in the same 
narrow lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to 
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SLC 
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers 
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments, 
however, are not governing this case. R. 164. 
Based upon this reasoning, the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that asked the Court to rule that the City Ordinance allowed Hansen to 
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travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. At the same time, the Court ruled that the Ordinance did 
not justify his actions. Id. This ruling is legally inconsistent and in error. 
Defendants presented the Trial Court with two State Statutes, Utah Code Ann. Section 
41-6-87 and Section 41-6-87.5 which they argue were violated by Hansen. While not referred 
to in the Trial Court's Order, one or both of these Statutes presumably serves as the basis for 
the Court's ruling that Hansen was required to ride on the right-hand side of the road, and was 
therefore acting improperly by riding in the left-hand bicycle lane. The two Statutes relied upon 
by Defendants do not compel this conclusion. The plain language of the Ordinance allows 
Hansen to travel in the left-hand bicycle lane. 
B. The Statutes and Ordinance, when read together, allow travel in a left-hand 
bicycle lane. 
As a general rule of statutory construction where two Statutes treat the same subject 
matter and one of them is general and the other specific, then the specific provision controls. 
J.J.W.v State, supra. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-87 is a general Statute which provides that bicycle riders 
traveling at less than normal speed must ride on the right side of the road. The Salt Lake City 
Ordinances are specific. Bicycles must travel in bicycle lanes if provided.5 [See Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.80.070(H)] and may travel on the left hand side of the roadway if in a designated 
5
 Section 41-6-87(3) would appear to support the requirements of the Salt Lake 
City bicycle lane Ordinance that bicycles travel in a designated bike lane if one is 
available. 
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bicycle lane. [See Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)]. There is nothing in the State Statute 
(41 -6-87) that indicates that exceptions cannot be created to the general duty to ride on the right 
side of the roadway. In fact, Section 41-6-87.5 provides just such an exception for left turns. 
The City Ordinance [12.80.070(1)] also provides an exception. Since the City Ordinance is 
specific and the State Statute general, the specific (Ordinance) controls. J.J.W. v State, supra; 
See Taghipour v Jerez. 52 P.3d 1252 (Utah 2002). 
The Court also has a duty to construe the Ordinance so as to give it full force and effect. 
Jerz v Salt Lake County, supra. The court also construes acts to be in harmony so as to avoid 
conflicts. Id; Murray City v Hall supra. 
Defendants argue that the State Statute (41 -6-87) pre-empts or trumps the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance. However, for that to be so, Defendant would have to show a specific intent of the 
State Legislature (when enacting section 41-6-87) to exclude a coterminous exercise of law 
making power on the subject, because they granted local authorities the power to regulate 
bicycle traffic U.C.A. Section 41-6-17(l)(h). See Gilger v Hernandez. 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 
2000). No such showing was made by Defendants. In fact, the specific grant of power to cities 
to regulate bicycle traffic set forth in Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h) indicates the 
Legislature's intention to allow the cities to regulate bicycle traffic as they see fit. 
The Court should construe each Statute so as to give it full force and effect. Moreover, 
they should be construed to find harmony and to avoid conflicts. This is especially so because 
the duty set forth in U.C.A. Section 41-6-87 is not absolute. The legislature itself has provided 
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exceptions to the general rule. The Court should hold that the Ordinance allowing travel in a 
left-hand bicycle lane is a valid exercise of the City's police power and that Hansen was 
justified in riding in conformity therewith. 
Point HI 
THE REPEAL OR JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF AN ORDINANCE DOES NOT 
ALLOW PRIOR ACTION TAKEN IN RELIANCE UPON THAT ORDINANCE TO 
SERVE AS A BASIS FOR FINDING THAT SUCH ACTION WAS NEGLIGENT. 
In their memoranda to the Trial Court, Defendants argued that the Court should find 
Ordinance 12.80.070(1) to be invalid because it conflicts with Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 41-6-87 and 41-6-87.5. See R. 111-115. Defendants argued that the Salt Lake City 
Ordinance conflicts with the State Statutes and that compliance with the Ordinance was a 
violation of State Law. Id. The thrust of Defendants' argument was that the Court should 
declare the Ordinance invalid thereby allowing them to claim Hansen was negligent for riding 
his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane at the time of the collision. Id. 
At oral argument Plaintiffs pointed out to the Court that the issue of negligence as such 
was not before the Court. TR at 6. What was before the Court was the sole issue of whether, 
under the Salt Lake City's Bicycle Ordinance, Hansen had a right to travel eastbound in the 
north bicycle lane on 200 South. Id. Plaintiffs argued that even if the Trial Court were to strike 
down the Ordinance, Hansen's riding in the left-hand bicycle lane would not have been 
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negligent, because invalidation of the Ordinance could not be retroactive. TR at 7. Hansen was 
justified in relying upon an existing ordinance. If a court subsequently invalidates the 
Ordinance, it would not make prior conduct, that was in keeping with the Ordinance, unlawful. 
To reach any other conclusion would violate rights guaranteed to Hansen by Article I, 
Section 9 of the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 18 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah which preclude ex post facto laws. These constitutional guarantees protect 
one against laws that punish as a crime an act previously committed, which act was innocent 
when done. See Monson v Carver, supra; In re Ennenga, supra. 
While the Trial Court declined to invalidate the Salt Lake City Ordinance R. 164 the 
effect of the Trial Court's ruling is to criminalize the behavior of Hansen which was in 
compliance with the language of the Salt Lake City Ordinance. R. 164-65. Such a ruling is a 
violation of Hansen's right to be free from a ruling which subsequently rules unlawful an act 
taken in reliance on the plain language of an existing city ordinance. See Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 18; U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 9; In re Ennenga. supra. 
A long standing rule of statutory construction is that enactments which affect substantial 
law are not applied retroactively. Olsen v Samuel Mclntyre Investment Co., supra; Madsen v 
Borthick, supra. Applying this rule, a ruling of the Trial Court which in effect invalidates an 
existing ordinance, thereby causing behavior consistent with the terms of the ordinance to 
become invalid, can have no retroactive application. Id. To hold otherwise would not only 
conflict with the longstanding rule of statutory construction set out above, but would violate the 
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the Constitutional Rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the Trial Court clearly misapplied the law in its June 5,2002 ruling and erred 
when it held that: 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that Plaintiff 
was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the 
direction he was against traffic. 
POINT IV 
ACTIONS DONE IN CONFORMANCE WITH AN EXISTING LAW 
ARE NOT NEGLIGENT 
A. Background. 
In its Order of June 5,2002, the Trial Court declined to find Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1) to be invalid. R. 164. This Ordinance allows, by its plain language, the operator 
of a bicycle to travel in a left-hand bicycle lane. However, the Trial court ruled that Hansen's 
riding of his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane was a factor to be considered in determining 
his negligence and that the jury instructions to be given in the case were to state that he had no 
legal right to so travel. R. 164. 
B. Argument. 
The term "lawful" is defined as "legal; warranted or authorized by law..." Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1032 (4th ed. 1968). Lawful conduct is that conduct which is expected of an 
individual or entity in the day to day activities of life. Society expects one to act "lawfully." 
25 
In determining if one has acted lawfully in any situation, the question asked is "did he 
follow the law?" See State, ex rel Kaczkowski v Fire & Police Commissioners of City of 
Milwaukee, supra. In fact, when the issue of whether action is proper comes before a court, the 
question is resolved by an inquiry as to whether the person or entity acted according to law. 
E.g. Metropolitan holding company v Board of Review of the City of Milwaukee, 173 Wise.2d 
626, 495 N.W.2d 314 (1993); State, ex rel Coastal Management, Inc. v Washington County, 
159 Or. App. 533, 979 P.2d 300 (1999). Mandamus may even be used to compel action 
according to law. e.g. Wolfgram v Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 694,53 Cal. App.4th 43 
(1997); Stratford v Crossman, 655 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1983). In certain circumstances, It has 
been held that there is an umbrella of protection from claims of wrongdoing where one acts 
according to law. Schlossberg v Schlossberg, 275 Md. 600,626, 343 A.2d 234 (1975). 
Therefore, by definition, Hansen was acting lawfully while riding in accordance with 
the express language of the Salt Lake City Ordinance. He is entitled to rely upon the language 
of the Ordinance as defining lawful action. Such lawful action cannot be negligent of itself. 
It is axiomatic that one acting in violation of law may be found to be negligent based 
solely upon the unlawful conduct. See MUJI 3.11, and cases cited in support thereof. The 
converse is also true. One acting in accordance with the express language of an existing law 
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may not be found negligent based solely upon conduct defined as lawful.6 Counsel has found 
no authority that would gainsay this elementary proposition. 
Therefore, given the language of the Ordinance which clearly says the operator of a 
bicycle may ride his bicycle in a left-hand bicycle lane in Salt Lake City, the Trial Court erred 
in holding that such conduct could be considered by the jury as a basis for finding Hansen was 
negligent. 
X 
CONCLUSION 
Premises considered, this Court should reverse the interlocutory Order of the Trial Court 
entered on June 5, 2002 and remand this matter back to the Trial Court with instructions to 
grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Hansen's legal right to operate 
his bicycle in the left-hand bicycle lane on 200 South pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1). 
6
 Defendants have argued that the City Ordinance conflicts with the State Statutes 
requiring a bicycle rider to ride, in defined circumstances, on the right side of the road. 
The Trial Court could not resolve this issue. Hansen, being a layman, would not be 
required to either recognize there might be a conflict, or how it might be resolved. He is 
legally entitled to assume an existing law is valid and act accordingly. 
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October, 2002. 
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APPENDIX 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES 
ORDINANCES 
RULES 
Sec, 9, [Powers denied Congress.] 
[1J The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress 
)rior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may 
>e imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 
[2.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, un-
5ss when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 
[3.] No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 
[4.] No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to 
le Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. 
[5.] No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. 
[6.] No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce of Reve-
ue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, 
• from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. 
[7.] No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
ppropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
jceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 
ne. 
[8.] No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no 
rson holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the 
nsent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of 
y kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. 
:. I, § 18 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
m. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Elections C.J.S. — 29 C.J.S. Elections § 6. 
I to 7. Key Numbers. — Elections «=» 7. 
e* 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing con-
tracts-] 
$o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
Ltracts shall be passed. 
1-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authori t ies — Traffic-
control device affecting state highway — Neces-
sity of erecting traffic-control devices. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with 
spect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable 
ercise of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control 
devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the high-
ways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic 
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which super-
sede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any 
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or 
junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-408; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration 
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of 
vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48; 
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 41-6-42; 
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59; 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by 
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any 
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe 
movement of traffic; 
(o) estabhshing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business 
district or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section 
41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under 
Section 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts; 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboards, and 
other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental ordinances as 
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed 
limits; 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this 
chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control 
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop 
before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in 
writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation. 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m), 
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice of 
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway 
or part of it affected as is appropriate. 
41-6-87. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of 
roadway — Duties, prohibitions. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the 
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then 
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway 
except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private 
road or driveway; or 
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited 
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestri-
ans, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it 
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge. In this subsection, "substan-
dard width lane" means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle 
to travel safely side by side within the lane. 
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more 
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the 
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the 
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on a laned roadway shall ride 
within a single lane. 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, 
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
41-6-87.5. Bicycles and mopeds — Turns — Designated 
lanes* 
(1) A person riding a bicycle or moped and intending to turn left shall 
comply with Section 41-6-66 or Subsection (2). 
(2) A person riding a bicycle or moped intending to turn left shall approach 
the turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After 
proceeding across the intersecting roadway to the far corner of the curb or 
intersection of the roadway edges, the bicyclist or moped operator shall stop, as 
far out of the way of traffic as practical. After stopping he shall yield to any 
traffic proceeding in either direction along the roadway he had been usmg. 
After yielding and complying with any official traffic-control device or peace 
officer regulating traffic, he may proceed in the new direction. 
\oj l^utwiinstanaing suosections (l) and (2), the Department of Transpor-
tation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official 
traffic-control devices to be placed and require and direct that a specific course 
be traveled by turning bicycles and mopeds. When the devices are placed, a 
person may not turn a bicycle other than as directed by the devices. 
68-3-5. Effect of repeal. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect 
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any 
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 
68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases. 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and 
appropriate meaning or definition. 
12.80.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawful acts. 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
A. When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a 
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian; 
B. To ride more than two abreast upon any street; 
C. To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk; 
D. To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would require 
the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars of the bicycle; 
E. To permit the bicycle such operator is riding to be towed by another vehicle or bicycle; 
F. To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section 
12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out 
in Chapter 12.104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other 
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police 
officers in the scope and course of their employment; 
G. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to carry 
on seats firmly attached thereto; 
H. When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any 
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn; 
I. To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle 
lane or when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-89 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 46, Art. 
18 §278) 
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MODEL 
UTAH 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
MUJI 3.11 
VIOLATION OF STATUTE, ORDINANCE, 
OR SAFETY ORDER 
A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence if it is 
shown that: 
1. The person injured belonged to a class of people the law 
intended to protect; and 
2. The law intended to protect against the type of harm which 
in feet occurred as a result of the violation. However, there are five 
exceptions to this rule: 
(1) When obeying the law would have created an even 
greater risk of harm. 
(2) When the person who violated the law was faced with 
an emergency that person did not create, and, by reason of the 
emergency, that person could not obey the law. 
(3) When the person who violated the law made a 
reasonable effort to obey the law, but was unable to do so. 
(4) When the person who violated the law could not obey 
the law because the person was incapable of doing so. 
(5) When the person violating the law was incapable of 
understanding the requirements of the law. 
The person violating the law has the burden of proving one of 
the exceptions. If an exception is proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, you must disregard the violation of the safety lawf and 
simply decide whether the person acted with reasonable care under 
the circumstances. 
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The above matter came before the court on June 5, 2 002, on 
plaintiff's Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants' 
cross motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present 
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through 
counsel Lloyd R. Jones, and defendant Nature Conservancy was 
present through counsel Robert Janicki. 
In this case plaintiff sought partial summary judgment in a 
motion filed September 26, 2001. The court granted defendant 
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Nature 
Conservancy was later added as a defendant and on March 28, 2002, 
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant 
Eyre joined in that motion. Plaintiff then renewed his motion 
for partial summary judgment. Each party responded and the 
moving parties each replied. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute. 
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at 
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time 
of the accident on the north side of the street, against motor 
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane. The lane is 
adjacent to vehicle travel lanes and on the north of the bicycle 
lane there is parking spaces for vehicles. He was just west of 
500 East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit 
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre as she was turning west 
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being south-
bound until she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle 
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her 
employer Nature Conservancy. 
ANALYSIS 
The standards for granting summary judgment are well known 
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of 
law the court should grant his motion and declare that under a 
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in the 
bicycle lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing 
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in 
conflict with State law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent 
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against 
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant 
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent. 
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time 
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Code Ann. 41-6-87 
required bicycles to travel 
(1) . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge 
of the roadway except when: 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an 
intersection . . . 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided 
adjacent to the roadway, bicycle riders shall use 
the path and not the roadway. 
U.C.A. 41-6-17 (1) (h) provides that local authorities, "with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of police power/' may "regulate the operation 
of bicycles . . ." 
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an 
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.80.070(1) which provided: 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked 
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the 
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway 
outside the marked bicycle lane except 
when making a left turn; 
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of 
any street, except when they are within 
a marked bicycle lane . . . 
Plaintiff thus argues that the court should declare that the 
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even 
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle 
traffic. 
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance may be enacted that 
covers subjects already covered by state legislation but only if 
state law does not foreclose local legislation and Mthe ordinance 
in no way conflicts with existing state law." 
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably 
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction 
of motor vehicle traffic. U.C.A. 41-6-87(3) is not to the 
contrary. The court reads that statute to mean that bicycles are 
still to ride with traffic, and if there is a bicycle lane, the 
bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection 
(3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic 
even in a bicycle lane. 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict 
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate 
bicycle traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under 
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in 
a marked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of 
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court 
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that 
such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police powers. 
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the 
tendency of most motorists, any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular 
street, is to look to their left for oncoming traffic, but not to 
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle 
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may not be within the police 
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it 
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance 
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the same narrow 
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to 
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SLC 
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers 
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments, 
however, are not governing in this case. 
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah 
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic. 
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles 
against vehicle traffic is approved. 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is thus 
denied. Defendants' cross motions for partial summary judgment 
is, however, also denied. Even if the plaintiff was not 
justified by ordinance in riding in the bicycle lane against 
vehicle traffic, that does not mean defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The riding conduct is certainly a 
factor a trier of fact can consider in determining negligence. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be 
one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative 
negligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have 
as to the safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct. 
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
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